After the Cold War, many in the
defense community explored new ways to leverage the rapid expansion of
information technology beyond traditional command, control and communications
functions. Naval innovators were at the forefront of this effort. Most
notably Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski proliferated the concepts of Net Centric Warfare and Admiral William Owens partnered
with Harvard professor Joseph Nye to pen an influential Foreign Affairs piece on America’s information edge.
Owens and Nye argued that the
US military advantage in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
command and control, and precision guided munitions enabled “a general ability
to use deadly violence with greater speed, range and precision.” In other
words, information would provide a significant advantage in conventional
military operations.
At the same time, CDR Randall
Bowdish focused his intellectual work on expanding the use of psychological
operations in the information age. Bowdish clearly took a different
approach in his research and notes, “By combining Clausewitz’s and Sun Tzu’s
ideologies, we can discern a goal for information age psychological operations
(PSYOP) -to compel the enemy to do our will without fighting. This goal is
particularly relevant today in view of an increasing American intolerance for
casualties. Information-age PSYOP, more than any other military instrument, may
provide us with an increased capability to pursue our national interests
without bloodshed.”
Modern western militaries have resisted
Bowdish’s approach of using non-lethal force to achieve policy objectives in
favor of traditional military fire power. As renowned military strategist Colin
S. Gray remarked, during irregular conflicts in the future the U.S.
armed forces “will need to curb their traditional, indeed cultural, love affair
with firepower.” While those in the West may not have recognized the value of
expanded use of information-based capabilities, others certainly have.
As explained in a 2003 Special Warfare Journal article,
Chinese strategists believe that psychological warfare should be included in
any long term strategy. Non-violent intimidation, media manipulation, economic
sanctions, financial attacks, information isolation and network attacks are all
valid tactics. Chinese psychological warfare experts advocated for a
strategy to attack the enemies’ mind leaving him unable to plan and to create
misperceptions that cause the enemy to not fully prepare. Future military
operations should be combined with operations focused on affecting the opposing
commander’s decision making process.
The Chinese thinking on psychological operations continues to advance and expand. In a recent backgrounder. Dean Cheng notes, “Successful coercive psychological warfare is the realization of ends for which one is prepared to go to war without having to take that final step and engage in active, kinetic, destructive warfare. From the Chinese perspective, given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and even conventional forces, there is also significant incentive to develop coercive psychological approaches in order to achieve strategic ends without having to resort to the use of force.”
As witnessed in the Vietnam
War, sophisticated adversaries will attempt to turn American public opinion
against its military efforts. Moscow and Hanoi certainly attempted to leverage
American anti-war and counterculture inertia to their advantage. As Giap noted
after the war, “Do not forget that the war was brought into the living rooms of
the American people… the war was fought on many fronts. At that time the most
important was American public opinion.”
Should tensions escalate with
China, the American public will be vulnerable. The growing schism between the
institutions of internal power (Government, media, police, religious
institutions, etc) and the American citizenry is expanding rapidly. This
creates an excellent opportunity for any skilled psyops practitioner to hammer
a wedge between the government and its people and to mobilize forces to
undermine government strategy. This problem is further exacerbated by what
former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, refers to as a highly ignorant American
public. The majority of Americans is simply not well informed on geopolitics
and is easily influenced by misinformation.
Is it possible to defend a
nation against widespread psychological operations? The Chinese believe
so. Cheng describes one of five broad tasks:
Implementing Psychological
Defenses. Since
psychological warfare can have such far-reaching impacts, in the Chinese view,
it is assumed that an opponent will mount psychological attacks. Consequently,
in addition to negating or neutralizing such attacks, it is necessary to expose
them, both to defeat them and to demoralize an opponent by demonstrating the
ineffectiveness of his efforts. Thus, not only must there be counter-propaganda
activities, but one must also publicize enemy machinations and techniques,
thereby exposing and highlighting their futility.
Considering the internal
dynamics of the United States, could the US mount an effective defense against
an adversary’s psychological operations? The cornerstone of such a
defense is trust. Given the partisan gridlock in Congress and the
scandals within the executive branch, the sense of trust in government may be
eroding.
In the end, the burden of such
a defense may fall on the US military. While this is not an optimal
solution, the US military still maintains a high degree of public confidence compared to other institutions.
Coincidently (or not) Congress recently lifted the ban on using propaganda on
Americans. What role, if any, does the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012,
which passed as part of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, play in
preparing for this national security dilemma?
Robert Kozloski is a program
analyst for the Department of the Navy. He is the author of Marching Toward the
Sweet Spot: Options for the Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity in the Naval
War College Review. The views expressed are his alone.
July 17,2013
( Posted by Robert Kozloski in Cyber, Navy, Tactics,U.S.Naval Institute, blog.usni.org )
This book examines President Theodore Roosevelt's use of the United States naval services as supporting components of his diplomatic efforts to facilitate the emergence of the United States as a Great Power at the dawn of the 20th century.
After reviewing the development of Roosevelt's personal philosophy with regard to naval power, the book traverses four chapters that reveal Roosevelt's use of the Navy and Marine Corps to support American interests during the historically controversial Venezuelan Crisis (1902-03), Panama's independence movement (1903), the Morocco-Perciaris Incident (1904) and the choice of a navy yard as the sight for the negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War.The voyage of the Great White Fleet and Roosevelt's actions to technologically transform the American Navy are also covered. In the end the book details how Roosevelt's actions combined to thrust the United States forward onto the world's stage as a major player, and cemented T.R's place in American history as a great president despite the fact that he did not serve during a time of war or major domestic disturbance. This history provides new information that finally lays to rest the controversy of whether Theodore Roosevelt did or did not issue an ultimatum to the German and British governments in December, 1902, bringing the United States to the brink of war with two of the world's great powers.It also reveals a secret war plan developed during Panama's independence movement which envisioned the United States Marine Corps invading Colombia to defend the sovereignty of the new Panamanian republic.
Batik: Indonesia's Masterpieces of Oral
and Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity
