THE ROYAL NAVY TRAINING SYSTEM

MENGENAL SISTEM PELATIHAN ROYAL NAVY 

Educational Technology.  Teknologi pendidikan yang diterapkan di Angkatan Laut Inggris / Royal Navy, sejalan dengan perkembangan teknologi di negara Barat pada umumnya.   Sejak tahun 1972 Royal Navy telah menerapkan metodologi pendidikan modern yang akrab disebut Educational Technology, dengan tujuan untuk mencapai hasil guna dan daya guna maksimal.

Educational Technology sebagai suatu sistem pendidikan modern terdiri dari tiga subsistem utama, yaitu :  Education, Development, dan Training.

CORBETT, CLAUSEWITZ AND SUN TZU

Even the most creative theories in history were not conceived in a vacuum; one way or another, they owe something to the works of others. To describe this intellectual and intuitive process, historian of science I. B. Cohen has developed a concept called “the transformation of ideas,” which reveals how great scientists have used the existing body of knowledge as a basis of or catalyst for their own inspiration.  Scientists such as Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin, for example, either synthesized and combined the work of others, while adding their own ideas, or were heuristically stimulated by existing ideas to develop their own original concepts. The same is true of those whose creative and analytical thought processes have “transformed” the intricacies of strategy—in this case, naval strategy—into an innovative theory or body of work. It is well known that Alfred Thayer Mahan, as he himself made clear, was significantly influenced by Baron de Jomini’s work and that Sir Julian Corbett was equally influenced by Clausewitz’s On War.

Image courtesy of bravenjohn.wordpress 

MARITIME STRATEGY FOR MEDIUM POWERS

Medium Power Strategy Revisited

Some fifteen years ago I set out, in a book called Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, some ideas as to the principles by which such powers could conduct their maritime affairs in the  foreseeable future – a future which should be subject to the minimum number of assumptions.

That caveat has been justified by events  since, principally by the destruction of the assumption that the bipolar world and associated Cold War would continue indefinitely. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine whether the theories of medium-power maritime strategy, such as they are, have survived intact or need to be modified.

One critical assumption, however, must be made and needs to be stated. It is that the nation-state is and will remain the principal unit of account in the world’s strategic dealings. That is not statement that would pass unchallenged on the other side of the world. The experience of Europe, and maybe to some extent the United States, over past years has tempted many to wonder if the primacy of the nation-state has given way to other elements of the global village : federal institutions, structure alliances, multi-national corporations, irredentist factions, non-governmental organizations, powerful and media-supported special interest groups. Those complexities and doubts are perceived as less far-reaching in this part of the globe; and for what it is worth I go along with that perception.  But, even if they are given less weight in the Asia-Pacific region, account must be taken of these developments -  for which a convenient shorthand is globalization – in any re-analysis of medium-power strategy.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Peloponnesian War, (431–404 bc),  war fought between the two leading city-states in ancient Greece, A Athens and Sparta. Each stood at the head of alliances that, between them, included nearly every Greek city-state. The fighting engulfed virtually the entire Greek world, and it was properly regarded by  Thucydides,    whose contemporary account of it is considered to be among the world’s finest works of history, as the most momentous war up to that time.

A brief treatment of the Peloponnesian War follows.

THE NAVAL POWER AT THE PACIFIC WAR

Comparison of Naval Power at the Pacific War

The strength and weakness of a battle formation at the sea depend on completeness of the important elements of the aforesaid formation pursuant to the mission assigned. Basically, a complete sea battle task force must have the combating ability in three dimensions, namely surface ship battle, anti-submarine battle, and anti-aircraft battle. The incompleteness of one element of the battle abilities may disturb the maneuver ability supposed toe able to be conducted. 

SOME PRINCIPLES OF THE BATTLE FIELD

At the sea war in Falklands in 1982, although the weaponry and censor technology had been more advanced  in comparison to the technology available during the World War II,  the principles of the battle field are proven to be very important in determining winner or looser of the war. 

Image courtesy of english-online.at

Falklands islands and their surrounding sea environment which are very closed to Argentine, namely about 300 miles,  for Argentine constituted a ‘ vulnerable zone ‘ and at the same an ‘ open zone ‘.   

But for British,  Falklands which is located approximately 8,000 miles away from its country,  the battle field in Falklands constituted a ‘ desperate zone ‘ and at the same time as the ‘ open zone ‘.

Sun Tzu wrote  :  “  When you are in the desperate zone,  do the battle !  We can survive the war in the desperate zone if we attack vehemently. “

Belgrano: Enemy ship posed threat to forces

"  In the afternoon on May 2, the British Submarine HMS. Conqueror shot two torpedoes of Mark VIII to an Argentinean Cruiser Ship “General Belgrano”. In 40 minutes General Belgrano sank. The attack of British submarine occurred at the waters about 36 miles out of “The 200 Mile War Zone” declared by British. This was recorded as a violation against the war limitation declared by the British itself. However, possibly such violation was certainly conducted on purpose, and became a part of British strategy to remove the power of Argentine Navy from Falklands territory. "  (  Lessons Of The Falklands War ).

ESCAPED FROM JAPAN'S ATTACK TO PEARL HARBOR

Those who survived from the bombing of Pearl Harbor

Motivated by the victorious spirit of Togo, the Japanese maneuver when attacking Pearl Harbor was conducted by using its utmost power, and as the core power to strike was the aircraft carrier. The attack leader was directly entrusted to Vice Admiral C. Nagumo, by then was in a position as Japanese  Carrier Fleet Commander.

FALKLANDS WAR : THE BRITISH ATTACK

In Falklands War, the naval strategy of avoiding the strong sides and attacking the weak ones was also applied by both parties in war. British, although in possession of more superior sea power comparing with Argentine, carried out the projection of its power from sea to the land with its first target was the weak side possessed by Argentine.

On April 25, 1982, or 23 days after the Argentine invasion to Falklands, British landed its command troops not in Falklands, but at Grytviken Coast in South Georgia. South Georgia consists of many small islands located  at the South East of Falklands, comprising among others  South Sandwich islands and Shag-Clerke coral islands. Its distance from East Falklands is more than 1000 miles, and is more than 1300 miles from the closest land of Argentine.Image courtesy of www.forces80.com

MORALITY AND COMBATING INSTINCT

The Law of Morality establishes harmonious relationship between people and the authority, so that people will follow their leaders without feeling worried and frightened to encounter any danger.

   There are three actions of the authority able to cause destruction  to his troops, namely: 
  

·                First, by ordering to his troop to go forwards or to retreat without realizing the fact that such a thing cannot be conducted. This is what the so-called “Paralyzing the Troops”.

·                Second, by ordering his troops in the manner as if he rules the kingdom  without realizing the condition of his troops. This will  “make the troops worried”.

·                Third, by assigning the officers of his troops without different classification, due to not knowing the principles of hierarchy applicable at the military environment.

SURPRISE ATTACK AND BISMARCK SEA INTERDICTION

Surprise attack is a war strategy taught by Sun Tzu, having various benefits, outputs and impacts either to our own troop or to the enemy. Written in the art of war of Sun Tzu :  “ Let your plans be in darkness and impermeable just like a black night, and when moving, you shall come just like a roaring thunder."

AVOID THE STRONG SIDES, ATTACK THE WEAK ONES.

Military tactic is just like water, flowing on its current naturally, namely from the high place flowing down to lower one. And so is in a war. Avoid the strong sides but attack the weak ones.

Water forms its current pursuant to the kind of land it flows. The soldiers will combat for their victory depending on the enemy they face. Therefore, just like water which is always not in fixed form, the condition in war will never be constant.

       

Stay away from enemy having perfect banners, avoid attacking a good troop in strong reliable structure is an art in learning the environment.

If our power is not in balance with the power of our enemy, it means that it is not necessary for us to make a direct attack.

(Sun Tzu)

The structure of strength of a fleet or sea combating force is determined by the number of ships and their types, condition and their capabilities.  A big power structure does not always guarantee its strength. And although the factor of technological superiority is still determinant, however it still depends on its situation and condition. It is for this reason that the term “the strong side” of a combating power at the sea shall be meant pursuant to its various situation in dimension of space and time.

THE JAVA SEA BATTLE

The Java Sea battle broke  on February 27, 1942 and caused the destruction and the sinking of the allies fleet together with its Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Karel Doorman.

The destruction of allies fleet, not only because of being in a hurry to leave for a battle field, but also arriving at the battle field in tiresome and exhausted condition. The combating spirit and morality of the fleet under the command of Admiral Doorman steeply dropped, besides  due to the factor of consecutive  destruction in Pearl Harbor and in Kuantan waters, it was also caused by the factor of command which was not yet well integrated.

THE BATTLE OF CORAL SEA

Sea battle occurring on day time, but in dark weather due to thick fog and heavy rain was the Coral Sea Battle, taking place on May 7-8, 1942.  The Coral Sea Battle occurred when the American task force led by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher tried to prevent the Japanese landing to Port Moresby.  

The battle in Coral Sea was a very specific sea war, because for the first time in history of sea war, a task force of carrier ships confronted with another task force of carrier ships.

THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY

The Battle of Midway took place on June, 1942, one month after the battle of Coral Sea. The failure of its maneuver in Coral Sea did not cause the Japanese strategy designers withdraw nor change the strategy and the operational pattern of its fleets.   Seemingly, the obsession of Yamamoto to destroy the American Fleet in Pacific never came to vague, and so was his obsession to match the  achievement of Admiral Togo at the battle in Tsushima.