Doctrine should be continually re-examined and improved. This, of course, is one of the important features of operations analysis ( Henry E.Eccles,Rear Admiral,Military Concepts and Philosophy,1965 )
INFLUENCES on the strategy process are both numerous and important. Most are relatively well known and understood because they are similar to the influences that affect almost any political decision. This chapter, however, deals with an influence peculiar to national security strategy decisions—military doctrine. A detailed examination of doctrine is in order for at least two reasons. Doctrine has, or should have, an extraordinary impact on the strategy process, and doctrine is an ill-defined, poorly understood, and often confusing subject in spite of its considerable importance.
What Is Doctrine?
One can readily find a
number of definitions for doctrine—some official, some unofficial—that often
differ by country or military service of origin. Most fail to capture the
significance of doctrine. Official definitions written in legalese even obscure
doctrine’s importance. Perhaps the best definition, one that is accurate,
concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting doctrine’s importance, is also
one of the simplest. Military doctrine is what we believe about the
best way to conduct military affairs. Even more briefly, doctrine is what
we believe about the best way to do things.
Two words are
particularly important in the definition. The use of the word believe suggests
that doctrine is the result of an examination and interpretation of the
available evidence. In addition, it implies that the interpretation is subject
to change should new evidence be introduced. Doctrinal beliefs are not immutable
physical laws but are interpretations of changing evidence (e.g., new
technology and new circumstances). The wordbest connotes a
standard—a guide for those who conduct military affairs.
Sources
The principal source of
doctrine is experience. In a sense, doctrine is a compilation of those things
that have generally been successful in the past. The repeated success or
failure of actions over time can be generalized into beliefs that, we hope,
will be relevant to the present and the future. Unfortunately, not all past
experience is relevant to the present (not to mention the future), and there is
no guarantee that what is relevant today will remain relevant in the future.
Thus, doctrine is a constantly maturing and evolving thing. Those “lessons”
from the past that seem to have proved themselves over an extensive period of
time, however, can be, and have been, not only generalized into doctrinal
beliefs but have also been raised to higher levels of abstraction to become the
so-called principles of war—doctrinal beliefs that are axiomatic.
Of course, doctrine is
not just the result of experience. Experience by itself has limited utility. As
Frederick the Great pointed out, if experiences were all-important, he had
several pack mules who had seen enough of war to be field marshals. The real
key is the accurate analysis and interpretation of history (experience)—and
therein lies the rub. Each individual looks at history through different
lenses, lenses shaped by a variety of factors, lenses that interpret history in
very different ways. The results are differing views among nations and among
military services within nations about the lessons of history and their
applicability to the present and future. This problem is best illustrated by
the disparate views concerning an enemy’s center of gravity.
Moreover, experience and
the analysis of experience are not exclusive sources of doctrine because there
are subjects for which there is no empirical evidence on which to base beliefs.
This is particularly true of nuclear issues—how to deter nuclear war, how to
wage nuclear war, and so on. Even though two nuclear weapons were used during
World War II, by no stretch of the imagination could one consider that
experience illustrative of what might transpire in a full-scale nuclear war. No
one has any real experience to draw on, or any history of the best way to deter
or conduct a nuclear conflict. For example, we assume that US nuclear
retaliatory forces have deterred attack for four decades, but we have no solid
evidence that this is the case.
In such evidential voids
as that found in the nuclear arena, we are forced to rely on extrapolations of
experience from other areas. We hope that such extrapolations are pertinent,
but our standards for judgment can only be logic, intuition, and “gut
feelings.” This is, obviously, a risky but unavoidable situation. Even worse is
the fact that in the nuclear realm we cannot afford to be wrong.
Development Problems
We have already alluded
to several significant problems in the development of doctrine. The lack of
concrete evidence in the nuclear area should be placed at the top of the
problem list because of the consequences should we make an error. What
nonnuclear evidence is pertinent to nuclear issues? Does any nonnuclear
doctrine really apply to weapons of mass destruction? Does conventional logic
apply when the consequences of nuclear war might include the death of
civilization? Would anyone but a madman actually initiate a nuclear war? What
would deter a madman? Can there be a winner (in some rational sense) in a
full-scale nuclear war? These are all doctrinal questions of the utmost
importance that frustrate nearly everyone who has to deal with them.
Problematic nuclear
issues are not the only difficulties encountered in the area of doctrine. Objective analysis
of experience can be especially difficult. This fact is best illustrated by the
US experience in attempting to deal with the legacy of the Vietnam War. The
passions of the Southeast Asian experience have died hard and have colored
nearly every attempt to analyze the conflict. To some, the lesson of that war
is a simplistic plea for “no more Vietnams,” a rather ill-defined lesson at
best. Others have attempted to identify scapegoats—finger pointing among some
military professionals, civilian leaders, and antiwar activists—the lesson
apparently being that if the scapegoats had been controlled or eliminated,
everything would have worked out for the best. Still others have passionately
criticized how the war was conducted and earnestly proposed fanciful remedies
and reforms. In short, objective analysis has been in short supply. In such a
situation, it is unlikely that sound doctrine will result. In the case of
Vietnam, almost no doctrine has resulted.
Perhaps the most
ubiquitous doctrinal problem is the tendency to let doctrine stagnate. Changing
circumstances (for example, technological developments) must be constantly
evaluated because they can modify beliefs about the important lessons of
experience. If current and projected circumstances do not affect the analysis
of history’s lessons, doctrine rapidly becomes irrelevant. The French
experience after World War I exemplifies the problem. Based on the demonstrated
superiority of the defense when ensconced in strong trench works during the
war, the French constructed the world’s most elaborate and sophisticated
fortifications along the Franco-German border. Unfortunately, the Maginot
Line’s static fortifications were irrelevant to the mobile warfare conducted by
the Germans in World War II. The French analysis of history’s lessons was not
tempered by technological change, particularly the advent of motorized ground
warfare supported by air power.
Finally, doctrine can
become irrelevant if the assumptions that support it are not frequently
reexamined for their continuing validity. The development of US air power
doctrine provides a pertinent example. Based on the ideas of Gen William
“Billy” Mitchell and further developed at the Air Corps Tactical School by
Mitchell’s protégés, the Army Air Forces went into World War II with a doctrine
based on the belief that strategic bombing would (and should) be decisive in
war. The World War II experience and the availability of nuclear weapons and
long-range aircraft in the postwar era further ingrained this notion. Military
budgets, force structures, equipment procurement, and training were all based
on the central doctrinal belief in the deterrent and warfighting decisiveness
of strategic bombardment. Even the tactical air forces became ministrategic forces
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The crisis came in 1965 when the United
States entered the Vietnam War and the bombing of North Vietnam began. American
air power doctrine was found to be bankrupt in Vietnam because its underlying
assumptions were untrue in that situation. Strategic bombing doctrine assumed
that all US wars would be unlimited wars fought to destroy the enemy and that
America’s enemies would be modern, industrialized states. Both assumptions were
crucial to strategic bombing doctrine. They were reasonable and valid
assumptions in the 1920s and 1930s, but invalid in the 1960s in the age of
limited warfare in the third world. The results were frustration, ineffective
bombing, wasted blood and treasure, and eventually the renaming of Saigon to Ho
Chi Minh City.
Types of Doctrine
For many years there has
been considerable confusion regarding the subject of doctrine. Some of this
confusion has resulted from ill-considered doctrinal publications in the wake
of the Vietnam War. In some cases these publications reflected the confusion
and consternation caused by the American failure in Southeast Asia, and they
certainly reflected an inability to analyze the war dispassionately. Part of
the confusion about doctrine also stems from the fact that there are three
distinct types of doctrine. A brief survey of these types should help resolve
some of the confusion.
Fundamental
Fundamental doctrine
forms the foundation for all other types of doctrine. Its scope is broad and
its concepts are abstract. Essentially, fundamental doctrine defines the nature
of war, the purpose of military forces, the relationship of military force to
other instruments of power, and similar subject matter on which less abstract
beliefs are founded. The following examples are typical statements of
fundamental doctrine:
“War is policy carried on by other means.”
“War is the failure of policy.”
“The object of war is to overcome an enemy’s hostile will.”
“The object of war is a better state of peace.”
An examination of these statements
reveals two significant characteristics of fundamental doctrine. The first is
the almost timeless nature of fundamental doctrine. It seldom changes because
it deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary techniques. The second
characteristic, which is really the basis of the first, is that fundamental
doctrine is relatively insensitive to political philosophy or technological
change. The statements, if accepted, seem applicable in democratic or
authoritarian states and cogent whether discussing Napoleon’s campaigns or
recent conflicts.
Environmental
As technological
innovations allowed man to put to sea and take to the air, man’s proclivity for
war quickly followed. Quite naturally, beliefs also developed about how best to
use sea power and air power. Thus, environmental doctrine (the rubric for sea
power, air power, land power, and space power doctrine) is a compilation of
beliefs about the employment of military forces within a particular operating
medium.
Environmental doctrine
has several distinctive characteristics. It is narrower in scope than
fundamental doctrine because it deals with the exercise of military power in a
particular medium. Environmental doctrine is significantly influenced by such
factors as geography and technology. Sea power doctrine, for example, is
obviously influenced by geography (there are many places one cannot take a
naval vessel) and by technology, particularly since the advent of naval
aviation and submarine warfare. Air power doctrine, on the other hand, is less
influenced by geography but depends totally on technology for its very
existence.
Organizational
Organizational doctrine
is best defined as basic beliefs about the operation of a particular military
organization or group of closely linked military organizations. It attempts to
bring the abstractions of fundamental and environmental doctrine into sharper
(yet still somewhat abstract) focus by leavening them with current political
realities, capabilities, and cultural values. Typically, organizational doctrine
discusses roles and missions of an organization, current objectives,
administrative organization, force employment principles as they are influenced
by the current situation, and, in some cases, tactics.
Organizational doctrine
has several salient characteristics that distinguish it from fundamental or
environmental doctrine. Organizational doctrine is very narrow
in scope. Organizational doctrine concerns the use of a particular force (e.g.,
US or Soviet) in a particular environment (e.g., US Air Force or Soviet Air
Force) at a particular time—today. In addition, organizational doctrine is
current and must change to stay current. This tendency to change contrasts
sharply with the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine and the
considerable staying power of environmental doctrine.
In the United States,
organizational doctrine comprises the bulk of doctrinal publications. It has
been further subdivided and specialized into doctrine for specific types of
forces, types of conflicts, and other subcategories. As the content of these
publications increasingly narrows in scope, it assumes the characteristics of
regulations or standard operating procedures. The distinction between beliefs
about how to do things at this level of detail and directives on the same
subject is a matter of conjecture.
Interrelationships
How do these complex
puzzle pieces fit together? Clearly, fundamental doctrine is the basis for all
other types of doctrine, and environmental doctrine is at least part of the
basis for organizational doctrine. One way to understand these relationships is
to visualize them as parts of a tree. The trunk of the tree is
fundamental doctrine and, of course, has its roots in history—the primary
source of doctrine. The tree branches represent environmental doctrine—each
springing from the same trunk, each individual, and yet all related. The leaves
represent organizational doctrine—dependent on both the trunk and the branches
and changing from season to season.
Doctrine Tree
The analogy of the tree
can be carried even further. For example, what would happen if the lessons of
history cannot be accurately interpreted? The results would be analogous to
cutting the roots and therefore killing the tree (i.e., defeat). What would happen
if there was no valid fundamental or environmental doctrine? This is analogous
to a diseased trunk or branch that could kill the tree, including the leaves
(again, defeat). The analogy of the doctrine tree illustrates that doctrine
must be a coherent whole to be valuable, shows the dependencies involved, and
emphasizes the often ignored importance of fundamental and environmental
doctrine.
Relationship of Doctrine and Strategy
Doctrine has many
functions. Its first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience
and a determination of beliefs. Its second function is to teach those beliefs
to each succeeding generation. Its third function is to provide a common basis
of knowledge and understanding that can provide guidance for actions. All three
of these functions come to fruition in doctrine’s relationship to strategy
decisions.
Doctrine provides, in
essence, a knowledge base for making strategy decisions. Doctrine is always
somewhat abstract and thus provides the foundation from which to begin thinking
when facing a concrete and specific decision. Without doctrine, strategists
would have to make decisions without points of reference or guidance. They
would continually be faced with the prospect of “reinventing the wheel” and
repeating past mistakes. Superior doctrine should be the storehouse of analyzed
experience and military wisdom and should be the strategist’s fundamental guide
in decisionmaking. The importance of this function was succinctly put by T. E.
Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) when he commented that with 2,000 years of
examples there is no excuse for not fighting a war well.*
*Quoted in J. A.
English, "Kindergarten Soldier: The Military Thought of Lawrence of
Arabia," Military Affairs, January 1987, 10.
As important as doctrine
should be at nearly every level of strategy, it often does not control strategy
or even have a significant influence on strategy decisions, a source of great
frustration for the military professional. This tendency has been most notable
since World War II as traditional military doctrine has often clashed with
political decisions in conducting limited warfare. In both Korea and Vietnam,
military leaders chafed under the close control of civilians whose decisions
about the conduct of the wars often ran counter to military advice. Many
military leaders contend such decisions played a major role in preventing a
clear-cut victory in Korea and in causing a clear-cut failure in Vietnam.
Civilian leaders, on the other hand, contend that traditional military doctrine
is incompatible with limited warfare. They believe that either or both of those
wars could have escalated to a superpower confrontation if the military had
been allowed to implement its doctrine.
The frustrations of
Korea and Vietnam highlight the fact that military doctrine is only one of a
host of factors influencing strategy decisions. The influence of doctrine is
inversely proportional to the importance attached to other factors. In Korea
and Vietnam, the threats of escalation and confrontation were of overwhelming
importance and negated the influence of military doctrine. These same kinds of
phenomena can also occur in peacetime. Military advice and requests concerning
force structures, weapon system procurement and force deployment (all of which
are—or should be— based on military doctrine) are often ignored, overruled, or
modified because of economic and political factors that assume overwhelming
importance. In both peace and war, the influence of military doctrine can be
negated, modified, or limited by any of the host of other factors that
influence strategy decisions. The degree to which doctrine influences strategy
depends on the relative importance of doctrine in the eyes of the
decisionmaker.
Thus in an imperfect
world, doctrine is not always accorded its proper influence, which suggests yet
another important function of doctrine. As the best way to conduct military
affairs, doctrine provides a standard against which to measure our efforts.
Many factors prevent the military from doing “things in the best manner, but
doctrine can still provide a yardstick—an indicator of success and a tool for
analyzing both success and failure. Doctrine can measure not only its own
impact on the decisiomnaking process but also its own relevance. If military
doctrine were followed to a substantial degree and success were not achieved,
this would indicate that changes to doctrine were in order; that is, experience
of failure would feed the development of new doctrine. If, under the influence
of doctrine, the strategy decisions led to success, the experience of success
would also add to the experience that feeds the development of doctrine. This
brings the strategy and doctrine relationship full circle. Doctrine influences
strategy (or it should) and the results of strategy become the experiences that
are the basis for doctrine.
________________________
Dennis Drew & Don Snow, Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems, August 1988, Published 1988 by Air University Press.
