The vision of Indonesia as a “global maritime nexus” (poros maritim dunia) gained prominence during the presidential campaign and seems set to become a central focus. While Indonesia’s emergence as a maritime power is by no means assured—it will face many challenges ahead—we may be witnessing the dawn of a new era in Indonesian history.
The precise details of that maritime vision remain a work in progress,
but some preliminary observations can be made. The foundation of the “global
maritime nexus” concept is primarily economic: it seeks to increase maritime
connectivity and thus economic equality between the various Indonesian
provinces. That argument has been convincingly advanced by Faisal Basri. Yet
according to Basri, the vision of Indonesia as a maritime
power isn’t limited to the economic dimension alone,
and can also contain a security or defense function, including the protection
of state sovereignty.
China’s expanded presence in disputed areas of the South
China Sea is increasingly bringing its fishermen, and its maritime security
organizations, into direct contact and often confrontation with those of
Indonesia. While the Indonesian foreign ministry continues to maintainthere’s
no dispute between China and Indonesia, China’s actions suggest
otherwise.
A number of incidents have occurred
in the area since 2010, resulting from what ultimately proved to be
unsuccessful attempts by Indonesian security forces to prosecute Chinese
fishermen operating illegally within Indonesia’s claimed EEZ. Those efforts to
assert Indonesian jurisdiction in its claimed EEZ are beginning to form a
pattern of persistent failure, a pattern which, if left unaltered, may
eventually compromise Indonesia’s military deterrent posture in those areas, as
well as the legal basis for its claims.
The most recent of those incidents
occurred in March of 2013. Since I first
wrote about that
incident late last year new details have come to light, including the apparent
use of electronic-warfare capabilities by the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement
(MLE) vessel Yuzheng 310. Based on the Indonesian captain’s own reporting, as
well as subsequent investigation and analysis, it now appears highly likely that
during that incident Yuzheng 310 jammed the communications of the Ministry of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) vessel Hiu Macan 001.
Consistent with the KKP captain’s
description of events, Yuzheng 310 may have been disabling his ability to
receive communications from his headquarters ashore, in an apparent effort to
sever the vessel from its command and control (C2) loop. It appears likely
Yuzheng 310 would have been calculating that—in combination with other coercive
measures—the action would force the Indonesian captain to release his Chinese
prisoners. The suite of measures had the desired effect, but might just as
easily have proved dangerously escalatory had the KKP captain instead decided
not to acquiesce.
Scott Bentley
NationalInterest.Org, September 24, 2014
Scott Bentley is currently a PhD candidate
at the Australian Defense Force Academy, UNSW. His research focuses on security
strategies in maritime Southeast Asia.
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