A review on the event of Falklands War in 1982, is trying to reveal the facts that the occurrence of such a war was caused by the political and military miscalculations. General Leopoldo Galtieri had a strategic assumption that he was so confident that the military force planned to seize Falklands would not make British mobilize its military power, but it would settle it down at the negotiation. And the quick response of British becomes the main factor determining its victory in Falklands.
Outputs of this study are expected to be able to be used in the efforts to settle the problems containing the dispute potency among countries, so that the unnecessary victims and losses can be prevented from happening among the parties in dispute.
" Nothing remains more vividly in my
mind, looking back on my years in 10 Downing Street, than the eleven weeks in
the spring of 1982 when Britain fought and won the Falklands War. Much was at
stake: what we were fighting for eight thousand miles away in the South
Atlantic was not only the territory and the people of the Falklands, important
though they were.
We were defending our honour as a nation, and principles of fundamental importance to the whole world - above all, that aggressors should never succeed and that international law should prevail over the use of force. The war was very sudden. No one predicted the Argentine invasion more than a few hours in advance, though many predicted it in retrospect. When I became Prime Minister I never thought that I would have to order British troops into combat and I do not think I have ever lived so tensely or intensely as during the whole of that time.
The significance of the Falklands War was enormous, both for Britain's self-confidence and for our standing in the world.( Margaret Thatcher : Argentina Invades the Falklands ) "
